ONE stage of the Iran war has ended, but the world may be mistaking a pre-election pause for lasting peace. Tehran’s economic leverage will likely remain strong through the US midterm elections in November, but could weaken once the votes are counted, raising the risk of renewed confrontation afterward.
In this dangerous new environment, how might the rest of the world position itself to avoid becoming collateral damage once again?
Whether the 60-day talks between the US and Iran will produce a durable settlement remains unclear – especially given the tit-for-tat attacks over the weekend.
But what’s most important for markets is that the interim agreement has restored energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz, the critical energy chokepoint that was effectively closed during the conflict. This has sent crude prices tumbling back near pre-war levels.
The clock is ticking, however.
From the start of the war, many – including myself – argued that rising oil prices would shape the politics of the conflict as much as missiles and diplomacy. That now seems to have been borne out.
The war may have lasted longer than expected, but economic and political pressures appear to have heavily influenced President Donald Trump’s decisions, as evidenced by the US willingness to give Iran many items on its wish list in exchange for simply reopening the strait.
A key deadline for the administration was always the US midterm elections in November – and that remains the case. The question now is what happens to the balance of power between Washington and Tehran after voters go to the polls.
The war was clearly unpopular with the American public. Trump’s net approval rating in anEconomist/YouGov poll fell from negative 17 at the start of the war to negative 24 before the ceasefire framework was announced, and has since recovered to negative 21.
Rising energy prices obviously played a big role in this. Trump’s net approval rating on inflation and prices has cratered to below negative 40.
How much damage control the Trump administration can do now will largely depend on the trajectory of gasoline prices over the next few months. Pump prices have already fallen to about US$3.90 per gallon, from a peak of near US$4.50 during the conflict, Energy Information Administration data showed.
But that could reverse if peace talks break down. Tehran might not even need to close the Strait of Hormuz to influence energy prices. It may only need to make traders believe that oil and gas flows through the Gulf are at risk. That risk premium could quickly feed into crude and gasoline prices, freight costs, fertilisers and industrial input costs. In an election year, that gives Iran power.
For now, energy traders have been willing to look through minor flare-ups between the US and Iran, with Brent crude down some 40% from the wartime peak. But that might change quickly if it appears Iran is willing to play its Hormuz card yet again.
The delicate balance of power might change significantly after the US midterms on Nov 3, however.
If Republicans lose seats, Trump could face a more hostile or divided Congress, making it harder to pass budgets and legislation.
Democrats are currently leading in the generic congressional ballot by over 5 percentage points, according to RealClear Polling, and are widely believed to have a strong chance of taking back control of the House of Representatives, where they only need a net gain of five seats.
Domestic gridlock could increase the temptation for Trump to seek political victories abroad, where he can make his mark with fewer constraints from Congress or the courts.
While Trump appears to have limited appetite to resume full-scale fighting now, he has received harsh criticism both at home and abroad for an interim deal that appears to favour Iran.
Moreover, Brent’s swift retreat suggests energy traders can quickly shrug off political risk. That may make renewed military pressure more attractive after the midterms.
So Iran may have the upper hand for now, but that could change if a deal cannot be finalized by autumn, a strong possibility given how far apart the parties are on key sticking points such as Iran’s nuclear program.
The upshot of this seesawing leverage is not permanent war, but persistent risk.
That leaves large energy importers – like Europe and much of Asia – vulnerable to unexpected spikes in oil and gas prices, and disruptions to the supply of fertilisers and other commodities in the coming years.
The best defence for these countries appears simple: reduce the hold imported fossil fuels have over their economies.
Europe seems to have gotten the memo. After two energy shocks in five years, many governments in the region are reconsidering domestic oil and gas production – a short-term solution – and accelerating investments in renewables and nuclear power to become less dependent on imported fossil fuels.
Yes, this shift would increase supply-chain dependence on China, the dominant player in renewables technology. But the nature of that dependence is different from overreliance on imported energy.
If gas and oil imports are interrupted, power plants and refineries that rely on them come under immediate pressure. But if China restricts exports of solar cells or wind turbines, existing solar and wind farms would largely keep running. Which is the safer strategic bet?
One phase of the Iran war may be ending, but the longer fight might just be getting started – and vulnerable countries would be wise to prepare for it.
The views expressed here are those of Joachim Klement, an investment strategist for Panmure Liberum and columnist for Reuters.
