MALAYSIA does not need to replicate India’s counter-terrorism institutions to learn from its experience.
India’s PRAHAAR, launched in February 2026 as its first comprehensive National Counter-Terrorism Policy and Strategy, raises a more practical question: how can Malaysia strengthen the implementation of its own security framework?
The Malaysia Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (MyPCVE) 2024–2028 already provides a national framework built around four pillars: prevention, enforcement, rehabilitation and reinforcement.
It calls for coordinated action by government agencies, civil society and other stakeholders. The priority now is to translate these commitments into measurable results.
Five measures could help achieve this.
First, Malaysia should conduct a whole-of-government coordination audit. The Royal Malaysia Police, intelligence agencies, Bank Negara Malaysia, the National Anti-Financial Crime Centre, immigration authorities and cybersecurity agencies have distinct responsibilities that can overlap in complex investigations.
The government should assess how quickly information is shared, whether responsibilities are clearly defined and where investigative delays occur.
Common operating procedures, secure information-sharing protocols and joint threat assessments could improve coordination. New institutions should be considered only where evidence demonstrates a genuine need.
Second, counter-terrorism legislation should be reviewed for clarity, effectiveness and safeguards. The Penal Code, Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 and Prevention of Terrorism Act 2015 should be assessed for operational gaps, overlapping provisions and implementation challenges.
Stronger laws do not automatically produce better outcomes. Amendments should address demonstrated shortcomings rather than respond reflexively to individual incidents.
Parliamentary scrutiny, judicial oversight and access to legal remedies must remain meaningful, while security measures should target credible threats without criminalising lawful political expression or religious activity.
Third, Malaysia should strengthen its capacity to disrupt terrorist financing and digital networks. Investigators need to trace suspicious transactions, examine cross-border transfers and preserve digital evidence within clear legal boundaries.
Financial institutions, regulators and enforcement agencies should improve cooperation in identifying transactions that warrant investigation, particularly where terrorist financing intersects with money laundering or organised crime.
Digital investigations should also address online recruitment and extremist propaganda without treating ordinary political discussion or religious practice as evidence of criminal conduct.
Fourth, MyPCVE’s prevention and rehabilitation pillars need measurable performance indicators. Prevention should combine public awareness, appropriate early intervention and cooperation with credible community organisations.
Rehabilitation should support disengagement from violent extremism, personal development and reintegration into society.
Educators, psychologists, social workers and enforcement agencies can contribute complementary expertise.
Programmes should be evaluated through indicators such as sustained participation in support services, successful reintegration and reduced reoffending where reliable data are available.
Assessments must also consider unintended consequences, including community stigmatisation.
MyPCVE’s fourth pillar, reinforcement, deserves equal attention. It focuses on strengthening national identity and character through education and socialisation, particularly during childhood and youth.
Properly implemented, it can support social resilience and respect for Malaysia’s diverse communities. It must not become a mechanism for labelling lawful political, cultural or religious differences as extremism.
Fifth, Malaysia should institutionalise independent evaluation and public accountability.
Annual assessments could report, subject to legitimate security restrictions, on threat trends, prosecutions, financial investigations, prevention initiatives and rehabilitation outcomes.
Parliamentary scrutiny should examine whether public resources are being used effectively and whether identified weaknesses are addressed.
Implementation should proceed in phases. The first should review existing laws, institutions, programmes and coordination procedures.
The second should establish common protocols, specialised training and measurable indicators aligned with MyPCVE’s four pillars. Subsequent reviews should assign responsibility for corrective action and publish progress where appropriate.
Regional cooperation must complement domestic reforms. Terrorist financing, online recruitment and digital evidence can cross borders rapidly.
Malaysia should strengthen information-sharing, mutual legal assistance and cooperation with regional partners while respecting applicable legal safeguards.
India’s PRAHAAR offers useful strategic lessons, but Malaysia should measure progress against MyPCVE’s objectives, not simply the number of laws enacted, arrests made or programmes announced.
More meaningful indicators include timely identification of credible threats, disruption of support networks, fair prosecutions and demonstrable progress in prevention and rehabilitation.
Ultimately, MyPCVE provides Malaysia with an existing foundation. The task is to connect its four pillars through effective coordination, transparent evaluation and accountable enforcement.
National security and the rule of law should reinforce each other. A strategy that prevents violence while sustaining public trust is more likely to remain effective over the long term.‒Oct 23, 2026
R Paneir Selvam is principal consultant at Arunachala Research & Consultancy Sdn Bhd (ARRESCON), a think tank specialising in strategic national and geopolitical analysis.
The views expressed are solely of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Focus Malaysia.
Main image: Pexels/Shahbaz Hussain
